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P R E F A C E
-0
ihz financial depression of the l ast ten months, so
prolific in downfalls and embarassments of corporations,
wiith the usually natural sequence,- their being thrown
into the hands of receivers, suggested to us the subject
of Receiverships nf Corporations for discussion. VIe
are well aware of the broad field covered by such a
theme, but h.ve, from the whole mass of cases,on the sub-
ject, attempted to point to some of those ,hich seemed
to -s miost important. Ue have considered first the su.b-
ject of receivers in general, and then proceeded to a
discussion of when and for what causes receivers have
been allowed to corporationsi closing with a -eneral outI
line of the rights, powers and duties of corporate re-
ceivers.
RECEIVERS I! GENERAL
A receiver is a ministerial officer of a Court of
Chancery appointed as an indifferent person between the
parties to an action, to take posession of and Ireserve
pendent lite, the fund ot propert, in litigation, when it
doe:; not seem equitable that either party should have
possession or control of it.
The office of Receivership and the appointment of
receivers have been assumed by courts of chancery for the
advnacement of justice and are founded on the inadequacy
of remedies in the courts of law only. The Lord Chan-
cellor well said in Eainbridge v. Laddeley, 3 LJac. - G.,
419,-"There are few cases that c.n be stated in which
the court has not jurisdiction, where it is essential to
the justice of the ca:e to interfere by appointing a re-
ceiver".
In exercising this wide discretion -w hich is permit-
ted to it the court shodid proceed with great caution for
"It is a r eemptory measure -Tlhose effect, temporal at
least, is to dispose of his property a defendant in pos-
session before a final judgment or decree is reached by
the court determining the rights of the l arties. It is
therefore, not to be exercised doubtingly but the court
must be convinced that the relief is needful and that it
is the aIpropriate means of securing an appropriate end.
And since it is a serious interference with the right of
a citizen :iithout the verdict of a jury and before a re,-
ular hearing, it should only be granted for the preven-
tion of manifest wrong and injury. And because it di-
vests the owner of property in his possession before a
final hearing, it is recarded as a severe remedy, not to
be adopted save in a clear case and never unless plain-
tiff would otherwise be in danger of suffering irrepa-
rable loss ."(Spelling on Private Corps., Vol. 2, Sec.840)
The remedy of receivership operates really as an eq-
uitable execution. "The order of '-pointment is in the
nature, not of an attachment, but a e"st:'.aionit gives
in itself no advantage to the party applyring for it over
other claimants and operates prospectively upon rents
and rrofits which may come to the hands of the receiver,
as a lien of those interested, according to their riggts
and priorities in or to the principal subject out of :ihih
,;ihich the rents and profits issue. In the exercise of
this summary jurisdiction a court of equity reserves, in
in a great measure, its ordinaty course of admimisterirv-
justice; beginning at the end and levying upon the Irop-
erty of a kind of equitable execution by which it works
a general instead of a specific appropriation of the is-
sues and I-rofits, and afterward determining who is enti-
tled to the benerit of the quasi-p' ocess. But acting,
as it often must of necessity, before the merits of the
cause have been fully developed, and not unfrequently
when the proper parties in interest are not all before
the court, it proceeds with much caution and circumspec-
tion in order to avoid disturbing unnecessarily or inju-
judicially legal rights and equitable priorities."
(Spelling on Private Corporations, VTo. 2, S(c. 341.)
From the foregoing observations it is plain that
courts of Chancery have entrusted to them the greatest
disuretion in this matter ar few absolute rules cold be
laid down to govern in cases involving the appointment
of receivers, but in Blondheim v. Loore, 11 Md., 394,
LeGrand, C. J., menti ns the following:-
1. That the power is a delicate one and to be exer
cised with great circumspection.
2. That it must appear that the claimant has a ti-
tle to the property and the court must be satisfied by
affidavit that a receiver is necessar., to preserve the
property.
3. That there is no case in which the court appoinS
a receiver merely bec,,use measure can do ne ,.n .. -
4. That fraud or imminent damage, ii irimediate 0' -
session shorld not be taken by the court must be clearly
proved.
5. That unless the necessity be of the most strin-
gent character the court will not :ppoint until the de-
fendant is first heard in response to the application.
As to the Appointment of Receivers for Corporations.
Our remarks so far hive been concerned with receiv-
ers in cases between individuals but we feel that these >
observations al;Ijly to cases of corporate receivers as
they applied to c:ses of receivers of individuals long
before corporate receivers were of such every day occur-
rence as they now are. It ii but pertinent to ob---
serve here that a court of Chancery has innate in itself
power to appoint a receiver for the rents and profits :-s
such of a corporation, but the power to appoint a receiv
er who shall bring about a dissolution of the corpora-
tion is primarily in the sovereign po.,;er (which power
created the corporation) but in imany cases and in most
we think, such power has been delegated to the chancery
tribun L: 3 by statute.
We may ncvw profitably turn our attention to a dis-
cussion of cases where receivers will be allowed for
corporations. This3, however, is a troublesome subject.
The exact limits within whdch courts of equity will ap-
point a receiver and when they will not resort to this
means of securing right and preventing failure of jus-
tice have never been expressed in form applicable to all
cases and for this reason we may perhaps arrive at a
true knowledge of the subject if we consider some actual
casea. And firstly, as to the appointment of a receiv-
er on an ex parte application. Of course it is fair to
observe that a court of chancery does not favor the ap-
pointment of a receiver on an ex parte apllication. ror"
to exercise siuch surmuary power and dbprivea corporation
of possession of its property without a chance to oppose
such a proceeding ought not to be entered upon lightly
3 0 fowa
Indeed, in French v. GfIVrla., 148, it was held that
such an allegation as "that if notice of this application
be given to the defendant the books recods and papers
of said bank will be so falsified or spiritid away that
they cannot ascertain the said frauds" was not sufficient
to justify the appointment 'f a receiver without notice
so th-3t the other parties h,vho would oppose might have op-
portunity so to do. This case may be extreme but it
shows the delicate manner in which the courts consider
ex !arte applications.
And now let us consider the question of insolvency
and default in mortgage obligations as a cause for the a
appointment ,f a receiver. As a general proposition a
receiver na.y be apointed when a corporation becomes in-
solvent, but the controlling question with the court must
be whether the protection of the public or the interests
of the creditors or of the stock-holders require that a
receiver be :-ppointed. If such interests require the p_1
pointment he will be appointed, otherwise not. However
in absence of a statute giving power to a court of equi-
ty it has no power to act a s a coutt of insolvency for
the liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent corpora-
tion. It has no peculiar jurisdiction over corporations
to restrain them in the exercise of their powers or con-
tcol their &ctions or T'revent them from violating their
clorters, Then their is no fraud or b-each of trust al-
leged as the foundation of a claim for equitable relief.
Thus in Pond v. Farmingham & Sound R. R. Co., 130 Mass .,
194, :here the bill alleged that plaintiffs were credi-
tors of defendant coml:,any which it yr s stated was insol-
vent, that all its property was mortgagyed to trustees fo-.
the benefit of one class of creditors; that it owed large
amounts to other crdditors, one of whom had attached all
its property; ti'-.t it was about to execute a lease to sa
said attaching creditor for the term of 99 years at a
rental yhich did not I:ay the interest upon its indebted-
ness; and that the executor of said le ase would be in-
jurious to the creditors and stockholders and prayed for
an injunction and receivers, the court held"In the ab-
sence of any statute giving the power, this court has nrl
authority to act as a court of insol-ency for the liqui-
dation of the affairs of an insolvent Rail Road Company."
But the appointment of a receiver is not a necessary se-
quence of the insolvency of a corpora.tion, but in al-
most all aases the application is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court unless a statute can be shown
regulating such appointments. In Deinke v. .7. (. & R.
Line Co., 80 1. Y., 599, the court/ay "Assuming that the
company was totally, insolvent, so that it could never re-
sume its corporate business the plaintiffs did not in
any aspect of the case have an absolute ri::ht to a rec-
eiver. The court in its discretion mighl conclude that
it was for the interest of all parties to , ermit the
property to be sold under the judgments or to be managed
and controlled by the executors." an' in Pullan v. C.
&C. R. R. Co., 4- Bliss, 50, the court says "I suppose
that in no c;se of a mortgage ought a court of chancery
to op)oint a receiver if the mortgaged property is od
srch a value as to render it clear that on a foreclosure
and sale the debt could all be made.
T1le appointment of a reciever does not follow as a
matter of course the foreclosure of a mortg ' 're against
the corporation. So it vas decided that a court of eq-
uity would not appoint a receiver of a rail road company
on its merely being shown there ,;ras a default in payment
of interest secured by a mortgage of the properties and
income of the company, when for such default the trus-
tees under the mortgage vere entitled to immediate pos-
session, had demanded immediate possession and had been
refused, for the court felt that it must be shown that
ultimate loss would happen to the beneficiaries under the
mortgage by permitting the property to remain in the
hands of the owners until final decree and sale, the
court saying, "We are not of the opinion, therefore,
that a court of equity is nouxd in every such case on
failure to pay to appoint a receiver without considering
other circtmustanees wlhich have a proper baaring on the
qvestion of appointment". ( Union Truseo. v. R. R. Co.,
4 Dillon, 114). In such a case, indeed, to appoint a
receiver 7would amount to the enforcement of a penalty and
equity does not enforce penalties. In fact we feel
that a court of equity rather ttempts to relieve for
penalties and leave the ,,arty to his remedy at law.
Ett when a deed of trust, executed by a railroad
Company, mortgaged its income and profits, as well as
its railroad and other property to secure the payment of
the principal and interest of its bonds, and authorized
the trustees, in default of the payment of the interest,
to take possession of the mortgaged property and apply
the income to the r. yment of the interest, Judge Woods,
in Allen v. Dallas & W. R. F. Co., 3 Woods318, said "In
my judgment, independent of the necessity for the appoimt
nLent of a receiver to protect and preserve the trust
property it was the right of the bond-holders vnder the
terms of the trust deed, to have a receiver appointed to
take 1 ossession of the property". In this case the
trustees had asked to have a receiver appointed.
In the c:.se of Warner v. Rising Fabirn Iron Co., same
report, the trustees had refused to take possession and
it ,das held tit on the refusal of the trustees to take
possession, e , the conditions existing which
a receiver would be
authorized the trustees to take lossession appointed at
the suit of the bond-holdet's.
So where a railroad company, heavily mortgaged ,
had made several defaults in the payment of interest ag-
gregating over $1 000 000, its business was decreasing
with a probability of further decrease from competition
with new lines; it was in need of repairs and improve-
ments; and the bond-holders were not in harmony and a
foreclosure ,%as about to be declared and no other way ex-
isted for applying the rents and profits of the road to
its debts, the court daid, "Much as I should like to be
free from the annoyance of a receivership it seems to me
I should be delinquent if I refused this appliaation"
for a recdever. Brewer, J., in ercantile Trust Co., v.
lvissouri & T. R. R., $6 Fed., 226. And so where a rail-
road company with its well known obligations to the pub-
lic has become entirel,r insolvent and unabTe to pi: the
interest upon its secured debts, unable to pay its float-
ing debt, unable to borr'ow money and in peril of breaking
up and the dtstructien of business likely, and confesses
this inability and a bill is filed by a mortgage bond
holder for an injunction against attacks upon the mortga-
ged property, and prays a receiveship to protect the
property of the corporation against peril, a temporary
receiver ray be appointed, although no default has taken
place on the securities owned by the plaintiff. (See
Brassey v 17. Y. Cen R. R. Co., 22 Blatchford, 72.) .
And also when the mortgaged property, consisting7 of
its road and other propety, is in adequate security for t
the mortgaged debt, and the company is insolv'nt and ap-
propriating its earnings to its own use, a receiver will
be appointed during the pendency of a bill filed by the
mortgagee to be put in pnssess ion of the mortgaged prop-
erty. The court saying "The views of this court on the
subject of appointing receivrs of railroads are well
known. It will not appoint a receiver except where the
right and necessity to do so are clear. On the facts of
this c >se, the only duty of the court to appoint a re-
ceiver _intil final hearing of the bill would seem to be
a3 nearly imperative as the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion can be said to be in any case" (Dow v. Memphis &c.
R. F., 20 i'ed.,260). And again, in Iaas v. The P hicago
Building Society, °9 ILL., 504, the courtsa,, "We take it
then to be undoubted law, that the court of Chancery may,
where the security is inadequate and a foreclosure pro-
ceeding is pending apT 1oint a receiver if there are cir-
cumstances of, frand or bad faith on the p art f the mort-
gagor, or other facts involved which would render a de-
nial of the relief sought inequitable and unjust." But
the court of chnczery waill not in mere deference to the
mere technical rights of a ver-, small minority of bond
holders (f a corporation, appoint a receiver where it ap-
pears that such action would imperil, if not destroy,
the interests of others whose rights are entitled to re-
ceive equal consideration. In the exercise of the broad
discretion which the court has in the matter of appoint-
ing a receiver, it will not make such apllointment if it
perceives that a much greater injury would result to
the se interested in the corporation than by leaving the
property in the hands then holding it, especially when it
appears that the large majority of the stock-holders and
bond-holders favor a fundinr- plan then being negotiated.
(Lysen v. Vabash Co., 8 Bliss, 247). Nor ,'ill a court
appoint a receiver where a mortgage upon income and tolls
provided that the possesiion of a canal should remain in
the company unless it was shown affirmatively that def-
ault ,Jas the result of some other cause than failure of
business, and the fact is not shown to the satisfaction
of the court. (See Stewart v. Canal Co., 4 Hughes, 47).
Though it might proue profitable to pursue these observa-
tions farther the brevity of this raper will not permit
such and we will now proceed to consider a few of the
cases when a receiver has been appointed for misconduct
of officers or managers of the corporation.
The officers and directors, of course, stand in a
fiduciary relation to the stock-holders aril creditors,
and if the property is mismanaged by them and is in dan-
ger of bring lost to the stock-holders and creditors
through collusion and fraud of themselves, the court may
properly appoint e receiver on application of any one of
the stock-holders.
In the Coal Co. v. Edwards, 103 Ill, 472, a bill
was fileu aleging that the corporaticn had contracted
a large indebtedness for sinking a shaft on trounds pur-
chased for that p urpose by the com,:any; that the company
had Lecome wholly insolvent; that the directors were fr
fraudulently mismanaging the affairs of the corporation
tlat the company had ceased to prosecute thD, work for
wihich it was organized; that it was useless fotr the com-
pany to attempt to resume business on account of its fi-
nancial embarassment, and prayed for a receiver; to which
the court says,--"On the face of the bill it would seem
to be a clear case for the appointment of a receiver, a
necessary step under the facts stated, if true, to the
preservation of the property of the corporation for the
benefit of' creditors and stock-holders interested in it.
That part of the decree appointing a receiver will be per
mitted to stand." And again in Forbes v. Memphis &c. P.
P., 2 ,oods, 323, a receiver :ias allowed :,here the money
paid by the bond-holders for the bonds of a corporation
was, with the assent and connivance of the directors, be-
ing squandered, wasted and embezzled by its officers and
agents instead of being used for the rurpose to which it
was pledged, and thereby the bondholders as well as the
bonafide stockholders were in dnager of losing all their
money by such frauds and embe7zlements, c-nd the corpora-
tion was being rendered wholly insolvent thereby. And
so on the same principle when the executive committee
of a company vote money to themselves, in addition to
their regylar compensation for their services 7s promot-
ers and originators of the company, or in consideration
of the members retittng from the executive committee, a
receiver will be appointed at the suit of the stockhold-
ers. (Blatchford v. Ross, 34 Barb., 42).
However it is only in a strong case, when the rndor-
ity are clearly violating the rights of the minority,
and putting their interests in imminent danger that a
court of equity will at the instance of a ;iinorit; of the
stock-holders, in a copporation, interfere with the man-
agement of' its affairs and appoint a receiver, and in
such a case, a bill with mere general charges of fraud,
illegality or mismanagement is mot sufficient to author-
ize the aprlpointment of a receiver by the court. Thus in
the case of Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga., 454, there was no
pretense th t the corporation was undertaking anything
outside of its charter, but the burden of the complaint
was that the majority of the stock-holders, through the
officers, were managing the company fraudulently,- not
for the benefit of' all, but in the interest of a portion
of the stockholders and this was sought to be n-,aintained
by the fact that the corporation granted to one of its
officers ,20 000 in its stock, and the latter subseqiient-
ilr repudiated his agreement and set up a claim of $20 000
expended by him for the corporation, which the latter con
sented to and surrendered to its treasurer 34 000 shares
of the stock, to be used by hi to raise funds under the
direction of a committee to put the property in order and
pay the debts. But the court held thait this was not
sufficient to take the property out of the lnds of the
stock-holders and the arpointment of a receiver was de-
nied, the court saying,- "The very foundation principle
of a corporation is that a i~mjority of its stock-holders
have a right to manage its affairs so long as they keep
within their chartered rights. 'They may, they often do
manage very fo, lishly, make very bad contracts and do
very reckless things -------------- As a court of equity
will not appoint receiver to carry on the business of
mining, it follows that thene can be no sufficient cause
for such a ill unless the maj orit y of t lie st ock-holda rs
:re pursuinm a o urse so illegl anrA ruinous 'js to re-
quire the affairs of the co'.j any to be stop ed" Th1. ;
we iere see what a confusion of all these cases clearly
demonst tes, that the "power behind the tlirone" (if
such it i:ay be called) in the ay pointment of a receiver
or not is, .,i'at wie at first stated, namely, the so3nd
discretion of the court, this of course supplemented by
statutory power as we also noticed.
WJe shiall now Troceed with the last branch of our
subject, the rights, powers and duties of a receiver.
Uliilc the receiver cannot take possession of the
property of the corporation, or be deemdd veste, with the
estate before he is appointed, yet when his appointment
is completedthe entire estate vested in him relatsback
to the time of ,-rantin,- the crder, and from that moment
no act can be done affecting the 1<roperty either by the
corporation or its creditors. 9o in the case of In re
John .erry, Receiver, 26 Barb., 55, where at 10 A. !I. an
order was trade that a receiver be appointed to take chara
of the rrop erty of the company and it was referred to a
referee to appoint a receiver and take from him the req-
uisite security, and at three o'clock P. T-. the same day
a party recovered - Judgment against the coici:.ny under
which the :sheriff levied on the property of the coipany,
it wvts held that such levy b the s3heriff was invalid as
and subsequently the referee appointed a receiver,- Hav-
aainst the r' , ceivur j
ing been appointed receiver and entrusted with the power
incident thereto, to take possession of the property, a
corelative duty is implied on the part of every one hav-
ing it in possession to deliver it to him, and one hav-
ing the property in possession violates the law in re-
sist ing the exercise of that lawful authority of a re-
ceiver to take possession of the property and the receiv-
er i-ay opl ose such resistance with all the means at his
comr and. 'Ie may call on the sheriff and through him ! ay
have the power of the county to prevent the courission
of a crime and thus enable him (the receiver) to execute
the order (of his appointment). (State v. Rivers, 60 Ia,
653).
Having gotten possession of the property the receiv-
er holds it, and 1 ersons who nLay have liens on the prop-
erty which w-iere acquii'ed before the receiver was appoint-
ed have no right without apilic-tion to the court (so ap-
pointing) to sell and dispose of the property. Indeed
after the receiver cets the property it is so exclusive-
ly ,within the control of the court tli.-t no one without
its permission is permitted to meddle with it under l;ain
of contempt of court. So he _irs a sufficient property
in the estate to T rosecute an action ur -n leave of the
court without the re qiiisite numer of share holders as
re quired by the charter. So the trernd of the decision
in Davis v. 'ray, 16 Ufall., 203, is that with the r~rorr-
ress and 2rowth of equity jurisdiction it. i-s beco'ie us-
ual to clothe receivers wi"ih much larrer rowers t!-.n were
former ly conferred; that in dome of the states they are
by statute charged with the duty of settling the affairs
of certain corporations -vhen insolvent and aro authorizd
expressly to sue in t.-eir mn names, and that the court
sees mo reason 1,why a court of equity, in the exercise of
its undoiibte authority, may not accomplish all the best
results intended to be secured by such !e7,islatioxi with-
out its aid.
The possession of the receiver is peculiar; it is
re-,ally not in himsely ut in thnse for whom lie holds the
prope-rty. lie is the officer of the T urt, and the Irop-
erty is in him as the,officer of the court. Hence if a.
policy of insurance runs to a receiver, in a desin.ated
suit, where it provided that it sholnld become void "if
any charge takes place in title or possession (except in
case of succession by reason of the death of the assured)
whethet by legal process nr judicial decree or voluntary
transfer or conveyance" it tiill not become void by a
change of rec-ivership. (In Thompson v. Phoenix Co.,
136 U. S., 287). So it is conceded that the 7general
principle is that a receiver without the previous direc-
tion of the court apr ointing him to incur expense out of
the property in his lands except such as iss essential
to the use of such property as getting it insured with
funds in his ha:nds, there the qioestion as to whether or
not he has exceeded his authority is a question in which
no one is concerned except the court appointing him and
the parties interested in the property within his charge
and himself. (Thompson v. Phoenix Co., 136 U. S., 287).
This case also determines that though the receivers use
of the funds is su bject to the approval of the court,
yet as the receiver is under such personal responsibilit.T
for the safety of the property t such use of the funds
t: ..... rr - 1  I .... ":as for insur-
ing would make a binding contract on the insurer.
As a general rroposition the yrinmry object of a
receivershii is tie -,reservation of the rroperty pending
litigation, the r-ceiver has not -o,er incident to ?-is
'eneral authority to make contracts. However the court
may authorize the receiver to exercise s'ich power but
without such authorization contracts made by him -re not
binding and the court may ratify them or disaffirm them
at its d4~cretion. Eut where a receiver is appointed
under a code provision under decree of dissolution, the
statutory provisions mark the limits of the court's com-
petency to confer powers upon the receivers od a dissolv-
ed corporation. HLowever, when these statutory powers
are conferred by decree they involve and carry with them
such powersi ,js may be implied from the general object and
spirit of the statute, or as are incidental to the au-
thority given expressly. .:o in the case of the Florence
(as Co. v. Tanby, 13 So., 347, where on the dissolution
of a corporation it appeared th t the dissolved company
had contracted to erect an electric plant for defendant
and had n-early completed the -iotkwhen it was dissolved
and no part of the agreed price had been paid, it was
held the complainant as receiver had power to compiete
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the work under the contract, and his offer to complete
the work and defendant's refusal, had the same effect as
if the company had not been dissolved and had itself made
the offer. And as we have before noticed, the receiv,'r
is trustee of the corporation, holding the property as
successor of the corporation, but he has no int-erest or
power over the prnperty embraced in the trust except as
is conferred by the statute. In controversies with
third persons he represents no rights of the creditors
and stock-holders which the corporation could not itself
represent, but in New York according to the case of Cur-
tis against Leavitt, 15 N. Y., 9, he succeeds to the - :
rights of creditors and takes titie under them, where
conveyances ctherwise v-iid have been made in fraud of
their rights, and in such c-ses he hclds adversely to the
cirporation.
As to the Standing of a receiver in regard to posj-
ession of corporate proretty the c -se of In re Atlantiv
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 16 Ala., Law Jour., 453, is in-
teresting. Ilere the Attorney General had gotten a re-
ceiver apponted who was in the discharge of his trust
when a decr4e of bankrubtcy was given against the compa-
ny. The receiver moved that the decree of b)nkrptc,,'
against the company be set aside and the court, through
Wallace, J., held thi,,t the receiver had sufficient stand-
ing in the court to make the motion and such motion w -s
granted on his a)pplicaticn. In 1Iew J-)rsey a receiver is
given such standing that he may not set up as a defence
in a suit for injuriesfor the negligent running of trains
on a rail road operated by him. A statute that requires
that such actions be brought ;iithin two years, the court
in this case saying,- "The receiver, within the sphere of
his instructions represents the company by virtue of
such a relationship he exercises all its necessary fran-
chises and in my opinion he is its agent appointed not by
the corporate body itself but by the law for certain end.:
of his own. Looking at the subject in the light
of pliblic policy there seems to be no propriety in giv-
ing a longer life to a right of -action arising during a
receivership than is -iven to one arising wh le the road
is in the hands of the directors, for if the investiga-
tion in the latter case should not be unreasonably delay-
ed, neither should there be procrastination in the formet
(See Bartlett v. Kein, 50 _H. J. Law, 260,). These cases
would seem to prove that the receiver is practicaly the
corporat irx itself, and it wouild seem that if there is
anu thing that the receiver is bound to do it is to make
the most possible out of the assets of the corporation.
Hence he is allowed to do anything that the c arporat ion
could do or have done to make the assetts as large as
possible. In Jacobs v. lurrin, 83 Ill., 424, the trust-
e,? under a deed of trust to secure the payment of a s.un
due an insurance company over which a receiver had been
appointed ,.as directed to se&l the premises described in
the trust deed in accordance with its terms. At the
sale Jacobs bid $2 938 and the receiver, in his officaal
capacity bid $10 070. The trustee struck off the land
to the receiver and it was held that the sale was valid;
the court saying,- "The right to so bid rff property in
satisfaction of a debt would belong to the power of' the
receiver to collect the debts of the cmnkpany. The act
wo ld be necessary and, in the exercise of such power in
order to make the most of property held as security for a
debt and prevent its sacrifice, we do not see why the re-
ceiver iight not do anything in this respect that the
company could have done to make the most of' its assetts".
At times the receiver of an insolvent corporation is in a
broader losition than a mere relresentative of the cor-
poratirn; representing both the corporation and credi-
tors, and when ne stands as such dual representative he
may and even must do many things which he cou!d not do
if he were the representative of the corporation merely.
In Pittsburgh 0 arbon Co., v. ) cllillan, 119 1. Y., 46, the
there was a controversy over a fund arising through an
unlawful combination over which the receiver ,.[as appointd
ed. The court, on rage 52, say,- "It is claimed theft
no action could have been maintained by the trustee, rep-
resenting the trust combination against the E. & L. Co.
to recover the purchase Irice of the carbons for the rea-
son that the illegality of the combinti(n would have
constituted a good defense. Assuming this predicate,it
is asserted that the receiver stands in the saae posi-
tion, and that his title is subject to the same infirmi-
tr'as that of the combinati-ons which he represents. 'ith-
out considering the assumptmin on which his -roposition
is ]_ased, it is a sufficient answer to the proposition
asserted, that the receiver unites in himself the right
of the trust combinatinn, and also the right of the cred-
itors, and that he may assert a claim as the representa-
tive of' the creditors, wi ich he mirht be unable to assert
as a representative of the combizirrtion x:erely. The 7en-
eral ri-le is well established tliut a receiver ta~kes the
title of the corporation (,r individu2l whose receiver
he is, and that any defence .hich would h Yve been good
against the former m y be asserted a;ainst the latter.
Fut there is a recognized excep, tion, % ich permits a re-
ceiver of an insolvent individual or corToration, in the,
interest of creditors, to disaffirm dealings of the debt-
or in fraud of their rights. Assuming that the trustee
could not have recovered of the B. & L. Co. for the rea-
sons suggested, it would be a verystrange arrlication of
the doctrine, that no right of action can spring from an
illegal transaction, which should deny to the innocent
creditors of the combination or to the receiver who rep-
resents them the right to have the debt collected and ap-
plied in satisfaction of their claim". But, as was said
at the beginning, the receiver is an "indifferent person"
hence he is not permitted to advocate the cause of one
claimant against another; between them he must be indif-
ferent, owing a like duty to all, and for that reason
should, as far as possible, see to it that each has an
oIrportunit: to enforce his cldm. e is in this respect
the r,'presentative of all the creditors and in bound to
give them reasonable but equal aid. !He ought to act in
good faith and adopt all proper and prudent measures to u
put the claim nf each creditor in the way of liquidation
before the Inriod of distributinn. Hence he is not jus-
tified in interposing any unconscientdons obstacles to
the liquidation of arVr demand, or in pressing with un-
reasonable haste the collection of a claim due the corpo-
ration with a view; of excluding an offset by a creditor.
(See Matter of Van Allen, 67 Earb., 230).
the receiver has power to compel the restoration of
allproperty unlawfully abstracted from the corpor ation
previous to his appointment -,nd in some states it is
held that even though the title to the property of the
corporation is not vested in the receiver, he may sue in
his own name to recover possession, and even maintain an
action for conversion if possession can not be restored.
Thus in Terry v. Bramberzer, 14 Llatchford, 234, a com-
pany in Connecticut had in the hands of one Castle of New
York goods on sale on commission on which Castle had a
lien as security for liability on acceptances for the
Connecttclitcompany. Castle assigned to Ramberger under
the New York Laws. 'arnberger took possession with notice
that the goods belonged to the Connecticut corporation.
Terry being appointed receiver of the corporation, ten-
who
dered the acceptances to Eambergerm refused to deliver
them and sold them. Terry as receiver now sued him; the
court hold,- "The plaintiff as receiver had a right to
institute suit in this state against the defendant for a
conversion happening prior to the irlaintiff's appointment
- The receiver is the agent of the law to collect
property of the corpor-tin and to wind up its affairs,
and for that purpose to do all acts which -ay be nesec-
sary in the execution of the trust. Ey authority of law
he acts in the rlace oft he directors but no title to
prop,-ty is changed -..-- whether the receiver or the
corporation is plaintiff the action is for the recovery
of the value of property the title of which is in the
company. EIeing thus the agent by the law to wind up the
affairs of the corporation, and to do whatever it coiild
do in this behalf, the receiver is authorized to collect
within the state, its debts and choses in action of what-
ever nature the same may be and to conmnence any proper
suits, whether sounding in tort or in contract". This
case was, of course, decided under the Connecticut stat-
utes
2o the receiver has the power, ,,ie think, to compel
the payment ofi unpaid subscriptions on behalf offcredi-
tors. If the capital stock of a corporat ion is a trust
fund then it is the duty and legal 6bli7ation of the
stock-holders to pay it in according to their agreement
that it may be applied to the payment of debts. So
where a court of' equity has conferred power upon the re-
ceiver to sue for, collect, receive and take into pos-
session all the goods rights and credits of the corpora-
tion, and the showing is that a share-holder is debtor
to the corporation to theamount ofhis share, or subscrip-
tion to the capital stock, such debt is a credit of the
corporation, and therefore the receiver has full power
and authority, not only to receive and collect it, but
to sue in his own name for the same. (Frank v. i dorrison
Receivers etc., 58 Md., 42.). T1i'e case of Chandler v.
Brown, 77 Ill., 333, does not lay down a doctrine opposed
to the above as some writers would seem to contend, but
holds that in order to maintain such an action the re-
ceiver must show that the stock-holdeI sued was made a
party to the proceeding in wlhich the receiver was appoint
ed.
So as incident to the power of the receiver to col
lect unpaid stock s-bscriptions, the receiver has the 1 ou
er to to make calls upon the stock-holders for balance
of c-lrital remaining unpaid to satisI'y creditors, and he
may call in such subscriptions from time to tjne or all
at on ce. In making such assessments the receiver
should have the sanction of the ® urt. Actually, howev-
er, the receiver irakes the assessment, the court passing
upon the question of whether facts exist which render the
assessments necessary and proper. As an example of how
careful the court is that the receiver do not proceed
without its sanction we cite the case of Glenn v. .'iocon,
32 led., 7, where an order contained these words,- "And
if there shall be any sum unpaid and due upon the shares
of' the capital stock of said company the said receiver
will proceed to collect and recover the sa-ae, unless the
persons of' whom the said sums may be due shall be wholly
insolvent, snd for this t-urpose may prosecute action".
etc., an! it was held that the authority intended to be
conferred was merely to bring suit in case the court
should levy an assessment, and that the order of itself
did not amount to a call for which prescription wouIld
begin to run.
Some courts fo even Ifurther as in the case of Chand-
ler v. Keith, 42 Ia., 99, where the terms of a subscrip-
tion Lo a joint stock company proscribed that after 20
percent had been paid, the balance should be "subject to
the call of the directors, as they may be instructed by
the majorit:Y of the stock-holders," and the cmpany hav-
ing become insolvent, a receiver was appointed, who in-
stituted an action against a stock-holder for the remain-
ing 80 percent of his stock subscription, and the court
held that the receiver had no authority to call upon the
stock-holders for payment until the court had determined
the amount of indebtedness of the corroration and fixed
the liability of' each share of the stock, and that this
fact should be averred in the petition of .the receiver to
enforce the payment of the 80 percent. This is a ver-,
strict decision, but we cannot but feel, in the light oi"
the great power that a receiver does possess, that the
court was right and eminently justified in arriving at
the conclusion above set forth.
I
In tile foregoing remarks ,,ie hiave not prnet-nded o
derive original conclusions from tl'e matters and case-
there discussed but have, as we stated in the be.,inning,
attempted to loint to some of the principal cases on Re-
ceivorships of Corportins, and we respectfully submit
the same as a"disctission" or perh ls moro properly a di-
Ithaca, New York;
April, 1894.
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